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Are Federal Courts Necessary?*
Milton I. Shadur**
It is really an honor to have been invited to deliver the second
Dooley Distinguished Lecture in Law. That honor is perhaps best
exemplified by the privilege of being thus associated with not one
but two illustrious Illinois Supreme Court Justices: not only Jim
Dooley but also the choice for last year's speaker, Seymour Simon.
My main hope is to get through the afternoon without someone (or
everyone) wondering, either audibly or to himself or herself,
whether Loyola should have reprinted the program to put the
word "Distinguished" back where it belongs, modifying the name
"Dooley" and not the word "Lecture."
Whenever I am invited to speak anywhere, I have two threshold
problems. One is that the speaking date has to be far enough in
advance so my mind will play the trick of persuading me the date
will never come-that illusion makes it much easier to say "yes."
And the second is closely linked to the first: Knowing that like all
lawyers I will really do too much of the work near the deadline, I
have to select a title that will at once be (1) sufficiently tantalizing
not to drive away the prospective audience, (2) broad enough to
cover anything I ultimately decide I want to talk about, and
(3) nevertheless non-misleading (applying a kind of Securities Act
Rule lOb-5 concept). That sometimes poses a problem one of my
* The following material is a lecture given at the Dooley Distinguished Lecture in
Law, Spring, 1986, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law.
** The Honorable Milton I. Shadur was appointed to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois on May 23, 1980. Judge Shadur received his
legal education at the University of Chicago Law School where he ranked first in his
class, served as Editor-in-Chief of the Law Review, and was elected a member of the
Order of the Coif. While still at the University of Chicago, Judge Shadur had the unique
honor of having two of his Law Review notes cited and quoted by the United States
Supreme Court. Two years after being admitted to the bar he was made a partner in the
firm founded by the Honorable Arthur Goldberg, which eventually became the firm of
Shadur, Krupp and Miller. While in private practice, Judge Shadur's numerous profes-
sional activities included serving as Counsel to the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, Direc-
tor of the Chicago Bar Foundation, and as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the
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former law partners used to describe as trying to build an army
larger than the Russians and smaller than the French.
In any case, that is how I came to label this afternoon's talk
"Are Federal Courts Necessary?"' If you have troubled to read
Article III of the United States Constitution lately-or maybe
ever-and especially if you ever did that as a nonlawyer, you may
well wonder how anything but a total spoof can be attached to that
title. On the other hand, if your regular reading diet extends to the
current Supreme Court opinions, you might agree at least some of
the Justices are voting "no" to that question on a consistent basis.
Either way I think I must begin by telling you a fairy tale. It seems
to me much better than most fairy tales because it is really true.
And of course I must start, as in all fairy tales, with "Once upon a
time. .... "
Once upon a time long, long ago there was an astonishing stu-
dent at a great law school-and because this is a fairy tale, I've
made up a fictitious name: Yale Law School. This student, having
become financially responsible for the support of his whole family
at an early age, had launched a career as an aluminum salesman,
dropping out of college off and on to make the necessary money for
himself and his family. It had therefore taken him eight years to
get his A.B. degree at Yale, and his law school education was also
punctuated by a full year away for the same purpose. That put
him into his early 30s while still in law school, then an extraordina-
rily advanced age for a law student. In addition, he spent a lot of
time while he was in law school engaged in the same activity of
selling WearEver Aluminum, cutting back on his time available for
study.
All this took place at the very same time when Robert Maynard
Hutchins, despite time out for service in World War I, had just
become Dean of the Yale Law School at the ripe age of 28. Many
years later I heard Hutchins speak of this student with a mixture of
awe and warmth, though on the same occasion the term Hutchins
applied to the student from the teacher's point of view was that he
was an "outrage." Our true fairy tale student consistently sat in
the front row, scowling at everything that was said, his arms obdu-
rately folded as he conspicuously declined ever to take a note. Of
course, though he never seemed to work and he appeared to spend
most of his time either working on the Law Journal or selling alu-
minum or going out for some beer or the movies on the eve of
exams, he naturally ended up number one in his class.
From there the student-now a lawyer-went on to become law
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clerk to Chief Justice Taft and then went into practice with Davis,
Polk and Wardwell, where he engaged in a high-level Wall Street
practice, closely associated with the preeminent lawyer of that era,
John W. Davis. Mr. Davis is reputed to have said that this young
man's mind was the best piece of legal equipment he had ever
encountered.
Now the fairy tale becomes somewhat shrouded in the mists, for
I have heard differing accounts of one of its key elements. But
whether as an outgrowth of a brief on the constitutionality of the
Securities Act of 1933, work that reportedly caused this young
man to begin a deep inquiry into the real meaning of the Com-
merce Clause (that's one version of the story), or in some other
way, William Winslow Crosskey-for that's the paragon whom
I've been describing-launched into what became a lifetime of re-
search and ultimately of writing on the real origins and intended
meaning of the Constitution.2 Crosskey read, it is fair to say, virtu-
ally every still-extant publication of any kind produced on this side
of the Atlantic Ocean during the last half of the 18th century-so
much so that he actually wrote like the 18th century man of letters:
style, punctuation, capitalization, though fortunately not spelling.
And his voracious reading extended into the 19th century as well,
searching for clues as to the intended meaning of the Constitution.
To Crosskey the Constitution was a document to be construed
like other documents: It was a contract, but one of the ultimate
nature-the social contract, written in an era in which Rousseau's
notion of the social contract was an important philosophical and
therefore governmental truth. And as a contract, it was to be read
in the conventional way. Its language was to be read in its contem-
porary meaning-not the reader's contemporary meaning but the
writers'. That concept is the same one put simply by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes and quoted in the frontispiece of Crosskey's book:
[W]e ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would
mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in
the circumstances in which they were used. . .. '
Holmes expressed that notion more elegantly in the famous apho-
rism from Towne v. Eisner:4
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin
of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.
Parenthetically, there has been an odd tendency for people to recall
and to use only part of that aphorism-the phrase "skin of a living
thought"-in support of exactly the opposite principle of construc-
1986]
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tion: one that gives changed meaning to the same words because of
changed external conditions over time.
Indeed, Holmes himself was far from one of Crosskey's favor-
ites. Much worse, the two short quotations I have just read to you
represent the height of irony, for Holmes was guilty of the same sin
he preached against. Despite his impeccable contract-interpreta-
tion principles as expressed in those quotations, Holmes' approach
to the Constitution was the wholly different concept of changing
the meanings of words, of adapting the document to changing
needs by altering the sense of the words themselves-an approach
that Crosskey saw as building on shifting sands. Let me read to
you my own modest claim to fame as one who, after having first
been schooled in conventional constitutional law with its pantheon
of heroes such as Holmes, came later in my law school career to
Crosskey's course, expecting to scoff and remaining to be con-
verted. In 1968, the University of Chicago Law Review devoted an
issue in principal part to in memoriam tributes to Crosskey and to
a posthumously published article by him. In that issue, Abe
Krash, now the senior litigating partner at Arnold & Porter but
also a reluctant convert to the Crosskey canon while Abe was a law
school classmate of mine, recalled this episode:
Crosskey will be remembered by his students as a great teacher.
He could hold a class spellbound .... Crosskey was greatly ad-
mired by his students, but some felt that he was a forbidding
figure. I found, on personal acquaintance, that like so many men
of gruff demeanor, he was in fact a sensitive and kindly man. He
was also a man of wit. I recall on one occasion he had been dis-
cussing the intricacies of the federal common law and Holmes'
opinion in the Black & White Taxicab case. Crosskey had at-
tempted, in a variety of ways, to make a point critical of Holmes'
position. One member of the class, Milton Shadur, then Editor-
in-Chief of this Law Review and now a distinguished member of
the Chicago bar, had persisted in arguing against Crosskey's
point. Finally, with a snort of exasperation, Crosskey turned to
him and said, "Shadur, you don't want to be like Oliver Wendell
Holmes, do you?" 5
But let me return to the main theme of this introductory section.
As you may have gathered, Crosskey was a predecessor of today's
strict constructionists, those who claim to believe the Constitution
should be read in accordance with the original intention of the
Framers. There are, however, major and critical differences be-
tween the Crosskey view and that of such shallow proponents as
our present Attorney General. Perhaps the most significant of
[Vol. 18
Are Federal Courts Necessary?
those differences for purposes of this afternoon's topic is Crosskey's
intellectual honesty. Unlike the present advocates of the original-
intent view, who are really anti-federal government and who use
their purported purist position as a means of espousing precon-
ceived notions of a weak central government, Crosskey worked to
find what the document really meant. His thesis was that the Con-
stitutional Convention comprised a great assemblage of lawyers,
scholars and draftsmen-perhaps the greatest in history-and that
the rational presumption was that they had produced an integrated
and internally consistent document.
What Crosskey sought to do by steeping himself in the writing of
the 18th century was to peel back the layers of misunderstanding
that are often generated by shifts in language meaning. None of us
today would dream of reading Shakespeare by using the current
meanings of words that have changed shape over time. That is
because we know, of course, that such changes have taken place. If
we did not know-if we mistakenly assumed that all words re-
tained the identical content despite the passage of time-we would
inadvertently introduce serious distortions in meaning. And
Crosskey illustrated dramatically that the same kinds of traps lurk
in applying today's vocabulary to the words in a great contract
written in the late 1700s.
Lest you think that revolutionary changes in the meaning of lan-
guage can occur only over several centuries, such as between
Shakespeare's time and our own, let me remind you of an obvious
180 degree turnabout in the same time-span of which I now speak.
Contrast the term "Our Federalism," used with capital letters
these days by a number of our Supreme Court Justices, with the
sense of the same term at the time of the Constitution. Today that
term is a catch-phrase for sustaining states' rights in preference to
those of the United States-a concept that was the hallmark of the
anti-Federalists in the years immediately preceding and following
1787. Through some legerdemain, the principles labeled by their
advocates as "Federalist" today are the very ones fought against by
the true Federalists in those days.
But that illustration, poignant though it is, does not advance us
in constitutional analysis. Toward the latter end we may more
profitably look to a cogent example of Crosskey's work, but I think
a conceptually breathtaking one. Crosskey's omnivorous reading
disclosed that both before and at the time of adoption of the Con-
stitution, the word "State" was not limited to its present denotation
of a geographic entity. Instead, "State" was, at that time, just as
1986]
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commonly used as a collective noun to mean the people within that
governmental unit, in precisely the same way that the words "In-
dian Tribes" then meant (as they still do) the people of those tribes.
Indeed the conventional usage in those days was to employ a plural
verb with the noun "State" used in that way-such as saying "the
State are"-a locution that obviously made no sense if today's
most common usage as a geographic unit was the only correct one,
but that was precisely right if Crosskey's reading (buttressed as it
was by virtually all of the contemporary literature) was accurate.
All of you may have guessed by now the implications of that
discovery, for Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution-
the famous Commerce Clause-reads:
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sev-
eral States, and with the Indian Tribes. ...
Note the use in that Clause not only of the word "States" but,
more importantly, of the word "among" (and not the word "be-
tween"). It was surely bizarre for the Framers to speak of com-
merce "among" the several States (using "States" in the
geographical sense) if they meant only transactions that cross state
lines. Crosskey's book treated at length the universal then-current
meaning and usage of the word "among," as well as the differing
meanings of the word "States," and concluded that the only natu-
ral sense of the constitutional language meant that Congress had
been granted broad power over commerce among all members of
the American people (that is, all the people of "the several States"),
not just over commerce between state and state in the geographical
sense. In precisely the same way that congressional power to regu-
late commerce "with foreign Nations" meant regulation of trade
with the people of those nations and not simply with the govern-
mental entities themselves, and in precisely the same way that con-
gressional power to regulate commerce "with the Indian Tribes"
embraced trade within tribes as well as between tribe and tribe, so
too did congressional power to regulate commerce "among the sev-
eral States" embrace all gainful activity among all the people of the
states. And that included trade among people within the geo-
graphical lines that now represent our only concept of the word
"State," as well as trade across those lines. None of the nonsense
that we have now come to call "interstate commerce"-requiring
that the transaction have some linkage with the crossing of a geo-
graphic boundary-made any sense in terms of the intent of the
draftsmen.
Indeed Crosskey buttressed that analysis not only by the simple
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parsing of words but by reference to all of the contemporaneous
literature-both from the Constitution's supporters, who intended
to cure the ills suffered in that respect under the Continental Con-
gress, and from the Constitution's anti-Federalist opponents, who
fought against its adoption because they sought to promote state
sovereignty in opposition to a centralized government. Though I
certainly do not expect to convert you with such a brief and super-
ficial exposition, in the absence of (or at least pending) your actual
reading of Crosskey's work let me ask that you take my word for
two things. First, in terms of the way that lawyers draft and ana-
lyze language as well as the overwhelming usage of the Constitu-
tion's draftsmen, Crosskey's position is far more compelling than
the artificial reading that has come down to us-a reading that has
forced the bizarre and unnatural distortions of the notion of "com-
merce" that the Supreme Court had to adopt beginning with the
New Deal days to deal with the real world. Second, Crosskey's
application of the same principles of research and construction
throughout the Constitution led him to a coherent, integrated doc-
ument of the kind that should have been expected from bright and
skilled draftsmen, not the hodgepodge of inconsistent and patch-
work meanings we have become accustomed to.
In sum, what Crosskey found was that the Constitution's fram-
ers had intended to create a strong rather than a weak central gov-
ernment, with broad powers to deal with all the concerns a
national government could expect to encounter. That purpose had
simply been frustrated when the political shift from the Federalists
to the Jeffersonians in the first years of the 19th century resulted in
a distortion of those goals. At that later time, even such a Federal-
ist and strong Justice as John Marshall had to fight a rearguard
Stalingrad type of defense to save some of the originally-intended
principles while surrendering others. Little wonder that Crosskey
entitled his great three-volume work "Politics and the Constitution
in the History of the United States," inserting this as his
dedication:
To the Congress of the United States in the hope that it may be
led to claim and exercise for the common good of the country the
powers justly belonging to it under the Constitution.
My reasons for first exposing to you the historical distortion of
the constitutionally-intended congressional power rather than of
the federal judicial power are twofold. In candor, my principal
consideration was that the example I chose and have just expressed
in capsule form is easier to explain: It depends on looking at a
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single clause of the Constitution and at the shift that has taken
place over time from the original meaning of the words in that
clause. My second reason is that congressional power and federal
judicial power are, of course, related. All of us know of the general
doctrine-prevalent when the Constitution was adopted and,
though maybe to a lesser extent, even today-that the scope of fed-
eral government is coextensive in all its branches: legislative, exec-
utive, and judicial. Thus a broader notion of federalism, in its
original sense, also tends to support a far broader concept of the
role of the federal judiciary than the one to which we have de-
scended. It is that latter topic-the proper place of the United
States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts in this country's
jurisprudence-on which I want to focus in my remaining time
today.
On that issue of federal judicial power, though, the search for
original meaning is much more complex than the simpler Com-
merce Clause analysis I have outlined for you. It involves, for ex-
ample, the interaction of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the
"necessary and proper" clause in Article I (what has sometimes
been termed the "sweeping" clause vesting expansive congressional
power), and the Supremacy Clause, as well, of course, as implicat-
ing Article III's definition of the range of federal jurisdiction-the
"cases" and "controversies" provision. And the study is made
even more difficult by the need for the reader or listener to shed all
the preconceived notions that have been ingrained by conventional
teaching based on modern usages-usages so different from those
of the Framers that should be controlling. Because this is just an
afternoon's and not a semester's course, I will essay to pique your
interest (I hope) with just two highly significant facts.
First, Article III, Section 2 extends the judicial power among
other things "to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under ... the
Laws of the United States. . . ." At that time "Laws"-the plural
as well as the singular form of the noun-was commonly employed
as a generic term to include not only statutory enactments but the
Common Law. Indeed I would remind you, for example, that
Blackstone's famous work (famous in the colonies when no other
lawbooks were available, either in the form of texts or as reported
decisions) was Commentaries on the Laws of England.6 And, of
course, Blackstone's Commentaries dealt extensively, really princi-
pally, with the English common law. Crosskey adduces extensive
similar contemporaneous usage in the United States.
But there is more direct evidence as to the very clause in ques-
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tion. When the Committee of Detail of the Constitutional Conven-
tion produced its original draft, that draft read that federal
jurisdiction extended to "all cases under laws passed by the Legisla-
ture of the United States."7 That phrase "passed by the Legisla-
ture," which would clearly have limited "Laws" to the statutory
source of law, was stricken from the Constitution on the motion of
the same Federalist delegate who contemporaneously explained to
the Convention the need for the establishment of national courts
over state courts to secure uniformity of judgments. Here too I
have oversimplified the evidence, but at the very least there is a
substantial basis for believing that the Framers' intent was that
what has come to be called the "federal question" class of jurisdic-
tion, embraced all cases under the Common Law, not just those
under federal statutory law.
Second and relatedly, in then-contemporary usage the "Com-
mon Law" meant the Common Law of England (in the sense of
both law and equity), a common law that by the law of nations was
carried over to this side of the Atlantic except as modified by statu-
tory enactments. At that time there was no separate "common
law" of the states. And that was true not only conceptually but
also because there were no systems for the reporting of decisions,
so there was no way for lawyers or even judges to know what that
common law-if it existed-would be.
Suffice it to say that those and the other things Crosskey ex-
amined in original-intent terms provide a convincing demonstra-
tion that the United States Supreme Court, and the inferior federal
courts when Congress created them, were intended to provide the
unifying juridical force in this country-to define the common law,
as well as the meaning of the Constitution and federal statutes, in a
way that would bind the state courts. Contrast the situation today,
when the intended position of the Supreme Court as that of a jurid-
ical head over all courts has long since vanished, when even the
system that prevailed for so long of two independent coordinate
systems without a common head has been replaced by the foolish-
ness of Erie v. Tompkins,8 under which federal judges must follow
state-court decisions in diversity cases slavishly, without even the
freedom our state-court counterparts may enjoy to reshape those
decisions.
Though I cannot take you on the necessary excursion (or per-
haps Odyssey is a more accurate label) to analyze the intended pur-
pose of Article III, I assure you the trip is a fascinating one.
Crosskey's entire approach yields a product that is a much better
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drafted, a much more cohesive version of the Constitution than the
one we have learned in law school and that we struggle with in
today's idea of federal jurisprudence. It makes more sense of a
great many things that must strike everyone as odd on a first read-
ing of the Constitution as a document, let alone as an instrument of
government. And it would certainly change the tune of a great
many persons-Attorney General Meese is a prime, though not the
only, example-who are really urging the skewed concept they call
"original intent" because they think it will quell what they view as
activist federal judges.
Let me not be misunderstood as espousing any notion that a par-
ticular problem must have been within the specific contemplation
of the Constitutional Convention for it to be covered by the Consti-
tution. That kind of warping comes with the serious misunder-
standing of the fact that the Constitution is the principal product
of our second American Revolution: the bloodless revolution rep-
resented by replacement of the Articles of Confederation with the
Constitution. Quite to the contrary of the position taken by the
present vocalizers of the original-intent doctrine, the real Constitu-
tion-understood as its Framers originally intended-is an activist
charter of government that does not need expansion by so-called
activist judges.
Perforce I must leave the full development of the analysis, with
all its interplay, to those willing to approach the questions with an
open mind-what the philosopher referred to as "suspension of
judgment." All I urge in that regard is that preconceived conclu-
sions not be permitted to get into the way of scholarship, a process
that has infected so much of the writing in this field (not the least
of which is much of the professorial reaction to Crosskey's work).
What I will do instead is to sketch briefly a few of the powerful
implications of the idea of a general supreme juridical head in the
form of the United States Supreme Court, supported by the lower
federal courts.
Among the purely incidental benefits, obvious at the outset, is
the destruction of three cottage industries I can think of, in each
instance freeing up the participants for more constructive work.
Let me touch on them briefly.
First, law professors and speakers like me could put their crea-
tive talents to better use. During the few months since I agreed to
talk on this subject, for example, I have seen and read-even with-
out any pretense at intensive searching-Judge Irving Kaufman's
New York Times piece headed "What Did the Founding Fathers
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Intend?"; 9 Professor Bob Bennett's speech before the Chicago
Council of Lawyers' annual meeting captioned "Judges and Origi-
nal Intent: Attacks on Judicial Activism";' ° Professor Bob Clin-
ton's 125-page article in the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review titled "A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction:
A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III";II
an article in the Boston University Law Review by Yale Assistant
Professor Designate Akhil Amar, entitled "A Neo-Federalist View
of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction"; 2
and an entire 350-page issue of the Georgia Law Review contain-
ing no fewer than nine articles collected under the rubric "Federal-
ism: Allocating Responsibility Between the Federal and State
Courts.' 3 Just think how much better (or maybe worse) off we
would all be if all that mental horsepower were diverted into differ-
ent channels, producing electricity of an entirely different type.
Second, there would be no further need for the Commissioners
on Uniform Laws as such, because that role in the justice system
would be performed automatically by a unitary system of justice
with the United States Supreme Court as its head. Just as Lord
Mansfield led the unifying force of the law merchant in Great Brit-
ain, so we would no longer have to deal with the arcane mysteries
of choice of law concepts during the period that one state but not
others opted for adoption of, or variances from, (for example) the
Commercial Code or some other codified body of law. When I
speak of the Supreme Court itself as the head of the system, of
course, that is figurative rather than literal. Its docket problems,
though not nearly as serious as some of the Justices would have it,
would preclude such large-scale personal intervention by the
Court.
But it would comport entirely with Article III, and with its orig-
inal intent, for the entire federal judicial system to play that role of
the national juridical head. Lest you think I am being revolution-
ary, Hamilton's Federalist Paper No. 82 contemplates exactly such
a structuring, under which lower federal courts as well as the
Supreme Court would appropriately have an essentially (or even
actually) appellate function in dealing with state courts' treatment
of federal causes. This subject is treated at some length in both the
Clinton and the Amar articles. Indeed the entire subject demon-
strates graphically just how far afield some current Supreme Court
Justices' concepts of the "principles of federalism" are (see, for ex-
ample, Justice Powell's opinions in such cases as Stone v. Powell,'4
Rose v. Mitchell'5 and elsewhere).
19861
Loyola University Law Journal
Third, my federal court colleagues and I could be spared the
need to spend time on such debates as what is the proper rule to
follow where different Illinois appellate court districts have ruled
differently on a legal question on which the Illinois Supreme Court
has not spoken. Although I have been one of the principal offend-
ers in this area by my efforts to contribute to the corpus juris, I
must confess there are more worthwhile and important topics to
occupy us than the question whether Erie and its progeny call for
us to try to predict what the Illinois Supreme Court might do if it
did take the problem on or whether we should instead (as Illinois
trial courts must) follow the rule in the appellate district that
would have the case had it been filed in the state rather than the
federal court. ' 6
Enough for my semi-jocular comments on the incidental benefits
of a Crosskeyan approach to the subject of federal judicial power.
More seriously, the Crosskey contribution to constitutional juris-
prudence, with its insistence on a return to the Framers' intention
armed with a real understanding of what the words meant to the
Framers themselves, makes a proper affirmative answer to "Are
Federal Courts Necessary?" far easier. It is easy to tick off several
proofs of that proposition:
1. Those who would propose to give Congress an unfettered
right to gut federal jurisdiction can be forced to grapple with the
evidence that such a right is not justified by Article III in light of
its language as explicated by contemporary meanings and the
drafting history of the provision. Though neither Professor Clin-
ton nor Professor-designate Amar agrees with the Crosskey anal-
ysis chapter and verse, they agree on the end result, and their
approaches to adducing the compelling evidence owe much to
the insights he pioneered. And as a result, each of them really
devastates the opposition among the academic community.
2. Any arguments that emanate from now former Chief Jus-
tice Burger and others for elimination of diversity jurisdiction are
weakened immeasurably by an understanding-stimulated by
Crosskey-style analysis-of the real purposes of the Constitu-
tion's grant of judicial power and of the intended role of the fed-
eral judiciary in this country's jurisprudence.
3. All the distressing states rights efforts of those who, like
now Chief Justice Rehnquist, would further subordinate the fed-
eral judiciary are exposed by the Crosskey approach as being in
direct contradiction to the Supremacy Clause.
4. Finally in this brief bill of particulars, the bizarre effects of
Erie v. Tompkins 7 and its progeny can and should be undone by
a return to first principles. Erie rejected Swift v. Tyson 8 on false
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premises after nearly a century, and Erie's own half-century life
is not too much to repudiate.
Examples could be multiplied further, but I fear they would try
your patience as well as my own.
One last word of confession: When I began this afternoon, I
spoke of this talk as a true fairy tale. That characterization should
be understood as having been chosen advisedly. Of course I recog-
nize there are flaws in the Crosskey fabric, and to that limited ex-
tent I have indulged in some oversimplification for rhetorical
purposes. Learning in this area, like that in the sciences, comes in
large part from new scholars who stand on the shoulders of their
predecessors. Crosskey was human, not infallible. But the essence
of the Crosskey canon, that of an intended strength and not an
intended weakness in the federal government, generally and most
particularly in the federal judiciary, is sound. It, and not the false
prophets of what is misleadingly called "New Federalism," should
be heeded.
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